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Abstract: Historically, the boards of the Industrial Development Commission (pre-
Independence), the Malta Development Corporation (1967–2004), and Malta Enterprise 
(2004–present) have always included representatives of private enterprise. The Malta 
Enterprise Act (2003) requires the minister responsible for the corporation to appoint 
persons (amongst others) who appear to the minister to have experience and show 
ability in matters relating to (amongst others) industry, trade, finance and organizations 
of employers. Almost identical provisions may be found in the Malta Development 
Corporation Act (1967).
 Such organizations play an important role in economic development, mainly through 
policy and practice. They also provide an ‘interface’ between private enterprise and the 
state, between private interests and the public interest.
 This paper proposes a Social Network Analysis (SNA) of the board of directors of 
Malta Enterprise and its predecessors, including that of the Malta Chamber of Commerce 
and Federation of Industries. Further data could also be gathered, especially from 
employers’ and workers’ associations, private entities such as Banks, or directorships 
of private enterprises, particularly those who had formed partnerships with other noted 
entrepreneurs who were on the boards of the studied entities.
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In current economic sociology and some economic thought such as institutional economics, the idea of state and market are that they constitute ‘two sides of the same coin’.
It especially holds in countries where historically there is no 
domestic national entrepreneurial class. Such an entrepreneurial class is 
necessary to allow the institutional changes needed to foster sustained 
economic growth based on a diversified economy with a productive 
backbone. It is more apparent in an island economy which is confronted 
with smallness, remoteness, and openness.1
After the Second World War, many British Commonwealth countries 
set up development corporations to counter the absence of a socially 
and politically powerful national entrepreneurial class in productive 
economic undertakings.
Malta Enterprise (ME) and its predecessors, namely the Malta 
Development Corporation (MDC) and the Industrial Development 
Board (IDB), are key to understanding the literature associated with 
the historical ‘weakness’ of the Maltese entrepreneurial class and their 
preference to concentrate on importation, distribution, real estate, and 
the local market.
Literature from Vella,2 Chircop,3 Brincat,4 Refalo,5 and Baldacchino6 
provide a historical understanding of the social groups and outline 
Malta’s economic development and the challenges faced by small 
islands and opportunities presented.
Such legal structures as the above development corporations provide 
the intention of bringing on board leading representatives of business to 
cultivate political, cultural, and technical acumen in order to kick start 
the island’s economic development.
1 G. Fischer and P. Encontre, ‘The Economic Disadvantages of Island Developing Countries: 
Problems of Smallness, Remoteness and Economies of Scale’ in Competing Strategies of 
Socio-Economic Development for Small islands, ed. G. Baldacchino and R. Greenwood 
(Prince Edward Island, 1998), 69–87.
2 M. Vella, ‘Forgetting Industry: The Scarce and Selective Visibility of Malta’s Industrial 
Experience in the Field of Vision of Maltese Sociology’ in Revisiting labour History, ed. J. 
Chircop (Malta, 2012).
3 J. Chircop (ed.), Underdevelopment: The Maltese Experience 1880–1914, (Malta, 1993).
4 M. Brincat, ‘The Birth of the Maltese Model of Development 1945–1959’, Journal of Mal-
tese History (2009), 34–52. 
5 M. Refalo (ed.), The Maltese Commercial Class 1870–1914 (Pisa, 2010).
6 Fischer and Encontre.
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The mercantile social bloc
The historico-politico conditions which governed what may be termed 
as the decline of the cotton industry and the ‘rise of the merchant 
families’ provide a context to understand the historical framework of 
the island’s entrepreneurial class.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, Malta had trading 
osts in Spain, Portugal, and France, amongst other countries. Its main 
products included the cultivation and spinning of cotton, salt, the 
manufacturing of caps. The cotton industry occupied nearly three-
quarters of the Maltese population.7
Chircop8 postulates that an indigenous cotton industry was not 
allowed to ‘take off’ owing to the alignment of local pre-capitalist 
interests and anti-protectionist policies by the colonial administration. 
In this regard, a mercantile economy emerged and engulfed all the 
sectors on the island, further fragmenting the traditional manufacturing 
industry.
The merchant families’ considerable influence – aided by its 
own reproduction, intermarriages, convergence with the colonial 
administration interests, and representation on board such as of the 
Chamber of Commerce, together with certain political acumen –
entrenched their socio-economic status and created a social bloc which 
‘lacked public spirit and the spirit of enterprise’.9
De-colonialization
The ‘mercantile social bloc’ and colonial admiration converged as 
‘Britain sought to develop Malta mainly in those areas that best suited 
its interests ... to serve ... the vital British commercial and military 
routes’.10 By 1957 approximately a quarter of Malta’s labour force was 
still employed by the British services.11
7 C. Vassallo (ed.), ‘Maltese Entrepreneurial Networks’, Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks: 
Four Centuries of History, 1 (2005), 125–44.
8 Chircop.
9 Chircop, 112–19.
10 Vella, 5.
11 G. Baldacchino, ‘Far Better to Serve in Heaven than Reign in Hell: Malta’s Logic of Relat-
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After the Second World War, owing to the atmosphere of upside-
down de-colonization12 and dependence on British military service 
expenditure, Malta’s economy was to be stimulated by capitalist 
development which was ‘to be an industrial one ... export-led ... and 
based mainly on wholly or partially foreign-owned enterprise’.13
The government’s vision was then orthodox with elements of 
classical, Keynesian economics, and Rostowian ‘stage’s scheme’.14 
This required a certain element of economic planning15 and ‘in the 
absence of a progressive [entrepreneurial class] able and willing to 
promote industrial development, ... the task of promoting capitalist 
industrialization had to be taken up by the [State]’.16
The relationship between the state and the private therefore 
developed as government acted as the ‘planner’ and private enterprise 
acted as ‘partner’ and ‘executioner’.17
Even though this relationship was being fostered, Baldacchino18 
notes that entrepreneurship in small island states is lacking, and 
usually results in local entrepreneurs being ‘... dismissed as deficient in 
organizational skills, technical know-how and risk orientation’.19
Brincat,20 citing the fifth development plan, also notes how such a lack 
of ‘enterprising spirit’ resulted in dependence on foreign investment as 
the ‘domestic bourgeoisie was incapable of generating self-sustaining 
industrialization’.21
In this respect Zammit22 notes how entrepreneurs required incentives 
to invest in Malta.
ing to the European Union’ in Competing Strategies of Socio-Economic Development for 
Small islands, ed. G. Baldacchino and R. Greenwood (Canada, 1998), 213–37.
12 Ibid. 
13 Vella, 54.
14 Ibid., 59.
15 Plans, Policies and Strategies of the Maltese Government: 1960–1990, ed. C. Zammit (Mal-
ta, 1994).
16 Vella, 57.
17 an assessment of industrial Development in Malta: a Cost-Effective approach, ed. S. Bu-
suttil, J. Dowdall, L. Baron, and A. Rote (Malta, 1970).
18 G. Baldacchino (ed.), ‘Bursting the Bubble: The Pseudo-Development Strategies of Micro-
States’, Development and Change, 24 (1993), 29–51.
19 Ibid., 34.
20 Brincat, 34–52. 
21 M. Brincat and J. Falzon, ‘Aspects of the Economic Conditions Surrounding the Birth of the 
Labour Party in Malta’, in Revisiting labour History, ed. J. Chircop (Malta, 2012), 122–74.
22 Zammit.
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The Aids to Industries Ordinance, the Industrial Development Act, 
and the Business Promotion Act offered ‘incentive packages’ to aid 
Malta’s economic development. This aid was to be curated by the above 
mentioned boards.
It is in this light that the acts and boards mentioned above illustrate 
how the interlocking of the ‘strengths’ of the private sector and ‘socially-
relevant goals’ of the state are intertwined.23
Malta’s developmental state
In his unpublished doctoral thesis Brincat24 suggests that Malta’s post-
colonial economic development could be described as ‘Developmental 
State’, even though it was out of ‘praxis that was rooted in and 
addressed Maltese realities’. The ‘Maltese Developmental State’ ‘can 
be described as a case of “political capitalism”: property, wealth and 
profit were mostly private, [whereas] the state and its bureaucrats acted 
within the overall parameters set by a capitalist system’.25
Brincat continues stating that Developmental States might have to 
curate their own ‘national bourgeoisie’, which entails the state acting as 
a ‘catalyst’ to curb the shortcomings of the local entrepreneurial class.
Therefore, the state, and through a ‘dedicated state apparatus, such 
as the Malta Development Corporation’ initiated relations with foreign 
enterprises to fill in the gap created by a ‘small, socially, politically, and 
technically weak manufacturing ... local bourgeoisie’.26
It is crucial to understand such apparatuses sociologically, as they 
offer a curated space where the interests and relations of both the state 
and the private interplay.
23 autonomy and Control of public Corporations: the Case of the Malta Development Corpo-
ration, ed. A. Borg (Malta, 1998).
24 Brincat, 34–52.
25 M. Brincat (ed.), Export-Led Industrialisation and Development in Malta, 1955–2000 (Mal-
ta, 2009).
26 M. Vella, ‘The Economics of Hypocrisy – Deconstructing Half a Century of Development 
Discourse in Malta: Notes on Work in Progress’, in Social transitions in Maltese Society, 
ed. L. Cutajar and G. Cassar (Malta, 2009), 251–394.
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State apparatus as a social network
The boards of directors of such ‘state apparatus’, mainly MDC and ME, 
were composed of representatives from government, private enterprise 
and associations, and unions.
The selection of such representative was entrenched in the legal acts 
of the development corporations and it is within reason to assume that 
such boards offered the conditions likely to generate networks in order 
to share resources and common goals.
Crossley27 stresses that ‘networks form and are formed around “social 
worlds” which centre upon specific shared or overlapping interest which 
bring actors together in collective action ...’, and as problems that arise 
or could arise are usually ‘resolve[d] via friends and friends-of-friends 
with whom we may even form temporary alliances’.28
Embedded networks
Although the author had undertaken an initial and exploratory research 
using a ‘positional approach’ and ‘linked lists’ methods, it was an 
exercise to understand the possibility of a social network within such 
state apparatus.
It is in this spirit that this paper proposes a social network analysis 
(SNA) of such state apparatus in order to understand the creation 
and the experience of the local entrepreneurial class in a modern and 
contemporary context.
It is within the discipline of (new) economic sociology to illicit such 
experiences and to frame them in ‘the problem of embeddedness’. Such 
economic activity should be understood through social relations and 
avoid ‘under-socialized’ or ‘over-socialized’ frameworks as ‘economic 
action must consider embeddedness in such structures’.29
Social network analysis alleviates such a ‘problem of embeddedness’ 
as ‘it takes as its staring point the premise that social life is created 
27 towards Relational Sociology, ed. N. Crossly (London, 2011).
28 J. Boissevain, Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators and Coalitions (Oxford, 1974).
29 M. Granovetter (ed.), ‘The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes’, Journal of 
Economic perspectives, 19 (2015), 33–50.
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primarily and most importantly by relations and the patterns they 
form’.30
In the context of Malta Enterprise and its predecessors, these concepts 
tie the Schumpeterian idea of entrepreneurship ‘by pulling together 
previously unconnected resources for a new economic purpose’.31 These 
resources ‘reside in separated networks’32 and need to be ‘bridged’. 
Such resources could be defined as ‘social capital’. Members who 
have weaker ties are viewed as having better social capital, where they 
capitalize their ties to be more successful.33 As argued by Bogenhold34 
‘national and global policy makers started to employ social capital as a 
strategic concept for the use of an increasing number of associations’.
SNA would provide the quantitative mapping of such networks and 
the ability of further qualitative research. The formation of networks, 
the flow of information, and resources which form ‘social capital’ 
could be empirically studied within the context of an embedded social 
network and the experience of the local entrepreneurial class.
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30 A. Marin and B. Wellman, ‘Social Network Analysis: An Introduction’, in the Sage Hand-
book of Social Network Analysis, eds. J. Scott and P. Carrington (London, 2011), 11–25.
31 Granovetter.
32 Ibid.
33 S. Borgatti and V. Lopez-Kidwell, ‘Network Theory’, in The Sage Handbook of Social Net-
work Analysis, ed. J. Scott and P. Carrington (London, 2011), 40–54.
34 D. Bogenhold (ed.), ‘Social Network Analysis and the Sociology of Economics: Filling a 
Blindspot with the Idea of Social Em beddedness’, American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology, 72 (2013), 293–318.
